Using US Strategic Reserves to Moderate Potential Oil Price Increases from Sanctions on Iran by Philip K. Verleger
NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW   Washington, DC 20036   Tel 202.328.9000   Fax 202.659.3225   www.piie.com
Policy Brief
Using US Strategic Reserves 
to Moderate Potential 
Oil Price Increases from 
Sanctions on Iran
Philip K. Verleger, Jr.
Philip K. Verleger, Jr., visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, is president of PKVerleger LLC. He recently 
retired from the faculty of the University of Calgary.
© Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved.
The United States has initiated new sanctions against Iran 
aimed at preventing it from collecting revenue from exports of 
crude oil. The European Union has followed, embargoing all 
imports of Iranian crude from July 1, 2012 and preventing any 
firms from entering into new contracts to import Iranian oil 
after January 23, 2012. The new US and EU sanctions could 
be the most draconian in many years. If implemented fully, 
US sanctions would force trading partners to choose between 
the United States and Iran. EU sanctions would cut Iran off 
from an important market. These sanctions, while reducing 
Iranian income, could pose a very serious economic threat to 
countries that have significant trade with the United States 
and/or import significant quantities of oil from Iran.
A number of US trading partners have raised serious 
alarms regarding the new sanctions. China, South Korea, 
and Turkey, in particular, publicly expressed concern the first 
week after President Barack Obama signed the establishing 
legislation. For example, Turkey immediately announced its 
intention to request a waiver. In response to such worries, 
US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and senior State 
Department officials visited several Asian countries in the 
second week of January. These trips assuaged some but not all 
fears held by America’s trading partners. 
Nations such as China, South Korea, and Japan, which 
obtain significant amounts of oil from Iran while enjoying 
large trade surpluses with the United States, are justifiably 
anxious. No doubt, these countries and others also worry that 
the new US and EU sanctions will disrupt oil markets, increase 
crude prices, and further slow global economic growth, which 
would, at a minimum, cut their export revenues. Iran has also 
objected to the sanctions, threatening an immediate cut in 
trade with Europe and warning of higher oil prices.
The United States can allay some of these apprehensions, 
as can the Europeans, by not being aggressive about enforcing 
the tighter sanctions. The new US sanctions law, H. R. 1540, 
grants the president authority to waive sanctions or exempt 
countries on a case-by-case basis. The European program 
offers its EU member governments some flexibility as well. 
Politicians and the public in the United States, Europe, and 
many other nations are set on using every economic means 
possible to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons development. However, 
public support will quickly wane if aggressive enforcement of 
sanctions results in higher oil prices, recession, and greater 
friction with trading partners in Asia. As is often the case with 
sanctions, the actions taken by Iran’s opponents may inflict as 
much or more harm on themselves as they do on their target.
There is, however, a way to put real pressure on Iran while 
moderating or eliminating economic fallout for the US and 
EU economies and those of their trading partners. Changes 
in the US energy sector have made a significant portion of 
the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) superfluous. As of 
January 2012, the US government held almost 690 million 
barrels of crude in reserve. Thanks to reduced consumption 
and increased production, one-third of the SPR—roughly 
280 million barrels—is no longer required to meet US obliga-
tions under the 1974 Agreement on an International Energy 
Program. This oil could be sold as surplus government prop-
erty, just as the United States has disposed of surplus stocks 
of other commodities in the past. Such sales would make a 
modest contribution to the country’s debt reduction efforts. NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
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More importantly, the surplus SPR stocks could be used to 
solidify support by reducing the likelihood of a significant oil 
price increase and the attendant threat of recession.
Many fear that world oil prices will climb if Iran is pushed 
from the global crude market. Such concerns are justified even 
though Saudi Arabia has indicated it would replace oil previ-
ously purchased from Iran. Saudi sales may dampen but will 
not totally stop price escalation, though, if the Kingdom’s 
incremental output is inferior to the crude it supplants. Here 
again, the United States can help. The United States originally 
purchased large volumes of high-quality crude for the SPR. 
That crude was needed by refineries 25 years ago because they 
could not process heavier sour crudes. Much of this higher-
quality crude is now surplus because US facilities have been 
rebuilt or closed. Sales of some SPR volumes to support 
tighter sanctions on Iran would likely aid the Saudi sales in 
moderating any price increase.
As noted, China and other Asian countries have already 
expressed concern that prices pushed upward by stricter sanc-
tions on Iran could harm the world economically. They are 
more likely to cooperate with US sanctions if the United States 
commits to a strategic stock release to forestall or dampen any 
impact on world oil prices. Prices might even be lower than 
presanction levels if the release is really successful.
Europe, too, can offset the effect of EU sanctions by using 
strategic stocks, although at this point such action does not 
seem necessary. Unrelated closures of European refineries and 
increases in Libyan production, shut during the revolution 
there, should offset the loss of Iranian imports.
In this policy brief, I describe how SPR oil could be used 
strategically. In section I, I summarize the details of the latest 
US and EU sanctions. In section II, I examine the alternatives 
to Iranian oil available to the world market. These include 
increased production by Saudi Arabia and other members of 
the Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). From 
this analysis, I conclude that the sanctions should have no 
impact on the oil market. However, should a market distor-
tion occur, the price impact could be countered in part by 
oil sales from the US SPR. Section III describes how SPR oil 
might be used to moderate potential prices increases resulting 
from the Iran sanctions.
I. NEW SANCTIONS ON IRAN
US Sanctions
President Obama signed H.R. 1540, the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2012, on December 31, 2011. Section 
1245 of the act imposes sanctions on Iran’s financial sector. In 
particular, subsection (d)(1)(A) of Section 1245 states that, 60 
days after enactment, the president
…shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose 
strict conditions on the maintaining in the United 
States of a correspondent account or a payable-
through account by a foreign financial institution that 
the President determines has knowingly conducted 
or facilitated any significant transactions with the 
Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian financial institu-
tion designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for the 
imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq).
In effect, the law offers central banks across the globe a 
Hobson’s choice. They can open accounts with the United 
States Federal Reserve to facilitate payments for exports and 
imports to the United States and conduct other financial 
transactions or they can open accounts with Iran’s central 
bank. They cannot do both. This means, in theory, that nations 
buying Iranian exports, predominantly oil, must terminate 
purchases from or find other ways to carry out transactions 
with that country by March 1, 2012, if they wish to keep 
doing business with the United States.
On its face, the policy gives trading partners of the United 
States a clear choice. They can trade with the United States or 
they can trade with Iran. The US Congress, however, created 
certain exceptions for petroleum in H.R. 1540. First, the law 
stipulates that the US Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) must prepare and provide reports to the president every 
60 days regarding world oil market conditions. These reports 
must describe “the availability of petroleum and petroleum 
products produced in countries other than Iran in the sixty 
days preceding the submission of the report.”1
Following receipt of this information, the president 
has 90 days to determine “whether the price and supply of 
petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries 
other than Iran is sufficient to permit purchasers of petroleum 
and petroleum products from Iran to reduce significantly in 
volume their purchases from Iran.”2 The sanctions described 
1. H.R. 1540, Section 1245(d)(4)(A).
2. H.R. 1540, Section 1245(d)(4)(B).
A number of US trading partners  
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in subsection (d)(1)(A) are to be imposed on foreign finan-
cial institutions 180 days after the law’s enactment (June 30, 
2012) if the president determines that
…there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petro-
leum products from countries other than Iran to 
permit a significant reduction in the volume of petro-
leum and petroleum products purchased from Iran or 
through foreign financial institutions.3
The law is clear. Sanctions must be imposed on financial 
institutions dealing with Iran if President Obama determines 
that oil supplies are available. However, as noted, Congress 
recognized such measures are extreme and thus permitted the 
president to grant exceptions or waivers.
Specifically, the president can waive the sanctions if he 
determines that a country has significantly reduced its crude 
purchases from Iran during the previous six-month period.4 
The president is also authorized to grant a four-month waiver 
to a country if he deems this to be in the national interest.
EU Sanctions
As the United States institutes these new sanctions, the 
European Union is moving ahead with a program to limit 
imports of Iranian oil. Foreign ministers from EU members 
met at the end of January to address the issue. Prior to this, 
several countries had proposed an immediate comprehensive 
ban on oil imports from Iran. However, some of the southern 
EU members, particularly the already financially troubled 
Italy and Greece, asserted that such measures would cause 
additional economic hardship. As a result, EU sanctions on 
oil imports have been delayed six months, as the Washington 
Post reported on January 13, 2012: 
The agreement, reached at a meeting of European 
Union ambassadors Thursday in Brussels, still has 
to be confirmed in European capitals and ratified by 
foreign ministers at a meeting scheduled for January 
23. It is designed to dilute the painful effects of a 
European oil embargo while at the same time seeking 
to maintain the gesture’s political impact.
The United States has been seeking to build worldwide 
agreement on reducing or halting Iranian oil exports, 
which amount to an estimated 450,000 [sic] barrels 
a day. The goal is to pressure Iran into opening its 
3. H.R. 1540, Section 1245(d)(4)(C).
4. H.R. 1540, Section 1245(d)(4)(D).
nuclear development program to meaningful inspec-
tion by the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.
Under the terms of the agreement, Greece, Italy, and 
Spain—the three European Union countries that are 
particularly dependent on Iranian oil imports—would 
be exempted from the embargo for even longer than 
six months, the diplomats said.
Greece, Italy, and Spain account for almost all 
European oil imports from Iran, with Greece counting 
on Iran for 22 percent of its imports, Spain almost 10 
percent, and Italy 13 percent. By comparison, France, 
which pushed for an immediate implementation of 
the embargo, buys less than 4 percent of its oil from 
Iran.5
The program approved by EU ministers adhered to these 
lines. Effective January 23, member countries cannot enter 
into new contracts with Iran for oil or petrochemicals. They 
can, however, still import oil from Iran until July 1 under 
contracts signed before January 23, 2012.6
The EU program may not be as rigid as it seems. The 
European Commission will review the proposed embargo on 
May 1 to make sure no member country is being adversely 
affected. Platts explained the details:
According to the EU statement on the Iranian oil ban, 
there is an option for the embargo to be reviewed “no 
later than May 1” to see how well EU countries are 
coping with finding alternative suppliers.
The EU imports around 500,000 b/d of Iranian crude, 
with Italy, Spain, and Greece particularly dependent. 
Countries and companies now have little over five 
months to secure alternative supplies.
There was no mention of any country specifically in 
the EU statement, though it is expected Greece could 
receive EU help in finding alternative suppliers willing 
to provide them with oil on the same financial terms 
as those with Iran.7
Platts quoted Catherine Ashton, a senior EU official, as 
saying the goal of the EU sanctions was to punish Iran, not 
5. Edward Cody, “E.U. Commits in Principle to Iran Oil Embargo,” 
Washington Post, January 13, 2012.
6. “EU Slaps Iran with Oil Import Ban from July,” Platts Oilgram News, 
January 24, 2012, 1.
7. Ibid., 1.NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
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EU refining countries: “When you look at sanctions, you have 
to take into account decisions that affect individual economies 
and the EU economy as a whole. We have to make sure the 
impact is the right impact.”8
Whether this flexibility is real, though, is an open ques-
tion. Other EU officials told Platts that a change in the 
sanctions program would require unanimous consent of all 
European members, adding that “France was unlikely to agree 
to any change to the July 1 date.”
Another report made it obvious that the French would 
say non to any revisions.
Ahead of today’s foreign ministers meeting, EU ambas-
sadors met to agree on small changes to the sanctions 
text to appease concerns from Greece. An addendum 
was added establishing a review of the measures on 1 
May “with a view to continuing oil supply in member 
states.”
But any changes to the oil embargo measures will 
require unanimity, which is unlikely according to one 
diplomat. “The French will never agree to any change. 
It is so clear,” the official said.9
US officials have demonstrated firmness that matches 
that of France. Treasury Secretary Geithner visited China and 
Japan in January to discuss the new sanctions. Separately, offi-
cials from Treasury visited South Korea for similar talks. A 
New York Times dispatch published on January 14 noted the 
United States’ determination to move rapidly on the sanctions 
issue. An official quoted in the article made the government’s 
intention absolutely clear: 
“We do mean to close down the Central Bank of Iran,” 
said a senior administration official, adding that oil 
purchases were the key to that effort because oil “is the 
largest source of their revenue.”10
Reactions to Sanctions
The US goal seems obvious. Sanctions on Iran will be tightened. 
Foreign central banks will be denied access to the United States 
after June 30, 2012, unless their governments begin to take steps 
to cut off or at least reduce oil imports from Iran. The sanctions 
8. Ibid., 6.
9. “EU Agrees on Iran Sanctions Date,” Argus Crude, January 23, 2012, 20.
10. Mark Landler and Clifford Krauss, “Gulf Nations Aid US Push to Choke 
Off Iranian Oil Sales,” New York Times, January 14, 2012. (The title of the 
print article was “US Efforts to Wean Asia from Iran Oil Gain Ground.”)
will have the greatest impact on countries that have large trade 
volumes with the United States and purchase significant oil 
volumes from Iran, especially China, Japan, and South Korea.
Leaders of these countries have responded strongly to the 
United States taking unilateral action against them for trading 
with Iran. Chinese officials dismissed the US action during 
Secretary Geithner’s January visit. A foreign affairs vice minister, 
Zhai Jun, voiced his country’s disapproval: “We oppose pres-
suring or international sanctions because these pressures and 
sanctions are not helpful. They have not solved any issues. We 
believe these problems should be solved by dialogue.”11
Japan has indicated it may request a waiver or exemption 
from the sanctions. According to Platts, Minister of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry Yukio Edano made this statement at a press 
conference on January 20: “Regarding implementation of the 
US sanctions, we have asked the United States to be flexible, 
including the granting of exemptions.”12 The article explained 
that the minister’s comments were made following a “working 
meeting” of US and Japanese officials regarding the sanctions. It 
added that the Japanese believe they needed an exemption due 
to the rise in national oil use after the disastrous 2011 earth-
quake. The minister also hinted at concerns over the efficacy 
and inherent risk of sanctions: “Edano said Japan has been 
scrutinizing the US sanctions from ‘effectiveness’ and energy 
security perspectives.”
South Korea has indicated it would seek an exemption 
rather than a waiver from the US program. According to a 
Platts dispatch,
The country will ask for a temporary exemption 
from restricting imports of Iranian oil in return for 
significantly reducing other transactions with the 
Islamic Republic, according to a senior South Korean 
official.13 
Meanwhile, South Korea’s central bank is struggling with 
how to deal with the sanctions:
South Korea owes Iran’s central bank some $5 billion 
for crude oil imports, but the money is trapped in its 
banking system because of the difficulty of sending 
money to Iran without falling foul of US sanctions.14
11. Michael Wines, “China Balks as Geithner Pressures China on Iran Curbs,” 
New York Times, January 11, 2012.
12. Takeo Kumagai, “Japan Seeks Exemption from US on Iran Sanctions: 
MITI Minister,” Platts on the Net, January 20, 2012.
13. “S Korea to Ask for US Understanding over Sanctions on Iran,” Platts on 
the Net, January 12, 2012.
14. Cho Mee-young, “South Korea Hikes Iran Crude Imports 20 pct in 
2011,” Reuters, January 25, 2012.NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
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Government energy policymakers and oil company 
officials in the three countries have not been quick to coop-
erate. The general response is that sanctions will not work. 
The oil industry in these nations apparently intends to ignore 
them for now. Most company executives indicated they had 
several months to prepare and were awaiting government 
instructions.15
India, another one of Iran’s principal customers, has 
begun to take steps to address the US sanctions program. In 
the process, the country seems to be using its leverage over 
Iran to drive down crude prices. The Indian approach appears 
to acknowledge the threat of US sanctions against its central 
bank since India is terminating relationships with Iran’s 
central bank. As an alternative, however, Iran is being offered 
the “opportunity” to open an account with a private bank in 
India. Indian firms would then deposit payments in rupees, 
the Indian currency, in those accounts for oil purchased from 
Iran. Vaijayanthi Chakravarthy, a Platts reporter, provided 
some details on this strategy:
An Indian delegation led by finance ministry officials 
with representatives from the Reserve Bank of India, 
foreign affairs ministry, and the oil ministry visited 
Tehran last week to try to work out a payment system.
Paying in rupees was one of the possible solutions 
discussed, according to an industry source who 
explained that Iran could open an account with an 
Indian bank and any payments can be made in rupees, 
which would also mean that Iran would earn interest.
But India has a trade deficit with Iran, which makes 
it difficult to make payments in rupees. While India 
imports around $12 billion worth of crude oil from Iran 
every year, Indian exports to Iran are slightly less than $3 
billion. Furthermore, the rupee is not a fully convertible 
currency.16 [emphasis added]
In effect, the Indian action would force Iran to shift its 
trade from other countries such as Germany to India or take 
very large discounts on the crude it sells to India. No doubt 
oil buyers in other countries will seek similar relationships. 
In fact, there are clear indications that this is happening in 
Turkey.
Those with long memories will recognize the resemblance 
between Iran’s current predicament and that faced by Iraq in 
15. “Business as Usual for Asian Buyers of Iranian Crude,” Platts, January 6, 
2012.
16. Vaijayanthi Chakravarthy, “India Says ‘To Tap Iran Fully,’ on Oil, Respects 
Only UN Sanctions,” Platts Global Alert, January 23, 2012.
the mid-1990s. Iraq was subjected to extreme sanctions after 
its abortive invasion of Kuwait. Under a UN program, the 
country was allowed to sell oil to purchase food. However, 
Saddam Hussein sought to circumvent the sanctions to 
generate revenue for his own purposes. Oil was shipped out 
by truck and other methods to bring cash into the country, 
albeit at prices well below world levels.17
Conclusion
US and European sanctions will dramatically circumscribe 
Iran’s market. Most of the country’s customers in large indus-
trialized nations in Europe, in Japan, and in South Korea will 
have to terminate or dramatically reduce crude purchases. 
Importers in China will also be required to cut back or engage 
in more convoluted arrangements that allow China’s central 
bank to limit or end relations with Iran’s central bank. As a 
consequence, Iran will sell less oil and be forced to accept very 
large discounts on volumes it does market.
In the next section I analyze the alternatives available to 
the world oil market. These include increased production from 
Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members. I then note in section 
III that changes in consumption patterns and increased North 
American crude production could facilitate oil sales from the 
US SPR, which, as noted above, holds more than 280 million 
surplus barrels.
II. OIL MARKET DYNAMICS: CAN SANCTIONS 
BE IMPOSED WITHOUT AFFECTING CRUDE 
PRICES?
Economic analysis of what effect the Iran sanctions will have is 
complicated. In theory, removing Iranian oil from the market 
should drive prices up—unless, of course, other countries raise 
output. Here as elsewhere, there is a huge gap between theory 
and reality. The sanctions could even cause prices to fall, 
possibly significantly. As explained in this section, prices could 
decline if the Iranian production affected by European and US 
sanctions goes to refiners in countries such as India, where it 
would sell for substantial discounts to world prices. These sales 
could in turn cause refiners in importing countries to boost 
production. The incremental product output would infiltrate 
the world market, reducing product prices and pulling crude 
prices down.
17. See Paul A. Volcker, Richard J. Goldstone, and Mark Pieth, The 
Management of the United Nations Oil for Food Programme, volume I, 
September 2005. This report was done for the Independent Inquiry 
Committee into the United Nations Oil for Food Programme.NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
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Thus, as I explain, the sanctions—combined with lower 
demand growth caused by the sharp slowdown in the US and 
EU economies—could decrease world crude prices signifi-
cantly. What happens will depend on the market’s evolution.
Understanding the Problem
Sanctions imposed on Iran will have two direct impacts. First, 
some oil that would have been sold by Iran into the world 
market will not be sold. Instead, it will be sterilized or left in 
the ground. Second, some of the oil Iran would have sold will 
still be sold but probably at a much lower price.
Whether the sanctions on Iran will affect the world 
market will hinge on seven factors: (1) the amount of oil Iran 
does not sell, (2) the amount of oil added to the market by 
other producers to offset the effect of sanctions on Iran, (3) the 
response of other producers to market opportunities created 
by sanctions, (4) the quality of the oil put into the market 
by other countries, (5) the response of the United States and 
other trading partners, (6) the actions taken by refiners in 
countries that buy Iranian oil at a discount, and (7) the ability 
of world refiners to adjust to changing crude slates.
Iran’s Role in the World Market
The sanctions on Iran could remove roughly 1.5 million 
barrels per day from the world market if data published by 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) are correct. This 
number differs from the 3.5 million barrels per day cited in 
many reports.18 I calculate the 1.5 million barrels per day by 
subtracting Iran’s internal consumption of two million barrels 
per day from its output. Table 1 summarizes the IEA estimates 
of Iranian crude production and consumption. The net, 1.5 
million barrels per day, represents the amount Iran presum-
ably sells.
It should be noted that this estimate is only an approxi-
mation. Iran produces 600,000 barrels per day of condensates 
and possibly 100,000 barrels per day of natural gas liquids, 
according to the Energy Intelligence Group. EIG experts have 
also noted that Iran’s product imports declined recently from 
almost 200,000 barrels per day in 2006 to less than 50,000 
barrels per day in 2012. After other adjustments, EIG puts 
Iran’s crude exports at two million barrels per day.
The quality of this oil is on a par with crude exported 
by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other countries. Indeed, as can be 
18. Details on Iran’s participation in the world oil market are opaque, to say 
the least. Our solid information is limited to estimates of Iran’s oil production 
and oil consumption. As noted on this page, Iran exchanges some volumes of 
crude oil exports for products, primarily with India and Turkey.
seen from table 2, the crudes produced by Iran are not very 
different from those in other countries. This similarity implies 
that other producers can supply oil of like characteristics. 
As a result, the loss of Iranian crude should not threaten the 
world in the way the loss of sweet crude from Nigeria or Libya 
did in 2008 or 2011, assuming, of course, that other nations 
boost output to replace the loss.19 Data on OPEC productive 
capacity (see figure 1) suggest the organization has incremental 
capacity of five million barrels per day, more than enough to 
replace any reduction in Iranian exports. 
The effect of sanctions on Iran can be seen in figures 1 
and 2. As noted, figure 1 shows OPEC crude production 
and capacity. Figure 2 presents an estimate of OPEC surplus 
19. Philip K. Verleger, Jr., “Rising Crude Oil Prices: The Link to 
Environmental Regulations,” Business Economics 36, no. 4: 239–48.
Table 1     Rough estimate of Iranian petroleum 
  supply/demand balance, 2011 (million  
  barrels per day)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Crude oil production 3.63 3.65 3.53 3.55
Estimated petroleum 
consumption
2.09 2.05 2.04 2.04
Net exports 1.54 1.6 1.49 1.51
Source: International Energy Agency.












Iran Azadegan 40 32.00 34–38
Doroud 120 2.90 32.8
Froozan 350 2.30 30.1
Iran Heavy 1,500 1.90 29.5
Iran Light 1,600 1.36 33.4
Saudi Arabia Arab Extra  
   Light
1,450 1.07 39.5
Arab Heavy 2,000 2.94 27.6
Arab Light 6,200 1.83 33.0
Arab  
   Medium
1,200 2.56 30.5
Arab Super  
   Light
330 0.05 51.4
Source: Energy Intelligence Group, International Crude Oil Market Handbook, 2010.NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
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capacity, measured as the difference between OPEC produc-
tion and OPEC capacity. Clearly, OPEC’s surplus capacity is 
more than sufficient to offset a total loss of exports from Iran.
However, as noted in section I, Iran will likely continue 
to export volumes to some countries, particularly India and 
Turkey, where alternative (a.k.a. barter) payment schedules 
are being established. As a result, the sanctions will not cut 
Iranian exports completely. They will, however, reduce its 
export income dramatically.
Another effect of the sanctions imposed by Europe will 
be a change in the geographic distribution of Iranian crude. 
During the first six months of 2011, European countries 
imported almost 700,000 barrels per day of this oil, according 
to IEA data. EU members bought two-thirds of this volume 
(450,000 barrels per day) (see table 3). If new markets are not 
found for this crude, it will need to remain in the ground in 
Iran.
At the same time, refiners in EU countries must find 
crude oil to offset the lost volume. Libya will no doubt replace 
much of it. Libyan production has increased sharply since the 
end of the civil war, recently reaching more than one million 
barrels per day.
Europe’s adjustment may also be eased by the sudden 
closure of all three refineries owned by Petroplus, an inde-
pendent refiner that had 670,000 barrels per day of refinery 
capacity in Europe at the end of December 2011. When 
European banks cut its credit lines, the firm was forced to cease 
all operations at these facilities by the end of January 2012, 
unexpectedly removing 300,000 barrels per day of refinery 
crude demand from the market. The Petroplus shutdown will 
cut European crude demand by an amount roughly equal to 
Iran’s shipments to Europe. As a result, the EU embargo may 
have no impact on European refiners.
Availability of Replacement Crude for Iranian Supplies
Should cuts in Iran’s crude exports threaten the global supply-
and-demand balance, the world’s oil-exporting nations could 
replace the lost oil with relative ease. For example, Saudi 
Figure 1     Monthly OPEC output vs. OPEC productive  
 capacity,  1999–2011
million barrels per day
Source: Energy Intelligence Goup.
Figure 2     Monthly OPEC surplus capacity, 1999–2011
million barrels per day
Source: PKVerleger LLC.











European Union 450 18
Italy 183 13 7
Spain 137 13 6
France 49 4 2
Greece 20 14 1
Germany 17 1 1
United Kingdom 11 1 0
Netherlands 33 2 1
Japan 341 10 14
South Korea 244 10 10
China 543 11 22
India 328 11 13
Turkey 182 51 7
South Africa 98 25 4
Sri Lanka 39 100 2
Taiwan 33 4 1
Source: US Department of Energy.NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
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Arabian officials have said the Kingdom can produce 12.5 
million barrels per day. Most authorities believe Saudi produc-
tion is now roughly 10 million barrels per day.
Saudi Arabia has also indicated its willingness to boost 
production to keep pace with higher demand. Indeed, Ali 
Naimi, the country’s oil minister, announced on January 15 
that Saudi Aramco would meet increased demand, as Platts 
reported:
Saudi Arabia has total oil production capacity of 12.5 
million b/d and is able to meet any increase in demand 
for crude oil from consuming countries, Oil Minister 
Ali Naimi was quoted as saying Sunday.
“We have confirmed our ability to do that and any 
doubts expressed by analysts about our capacity are 
incorrect,’ Naimi was quoted as saying by the Saudi 
Alwatan newspaper. At current capacity, the kingdom 
is able to “meet any increase in demand from 
consuming countries,” Naimi added.
The Saudi minister spoke after signing an agreement 
Saturday with China’s Sinopec for a 400,000 b/d joint 
venture refinery with Saudi Aramco to be located at 
Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu.20
Naimi elaborated on his views in an interview with CNN 
on January 16. Speaking with correspondent John Defterios, 
he said the country was producing between 9.4 million and 
9.8 million barrels per day and then added, “I believe we can 
easily get up to 11.4, 11.8 almost immediately, in a few days. 
Because all we need is to turn valves. Now to get to the next 
700 (thousand) or so, we probably need about 90 days.”21
Libya will also boost oil output in 2012, as mentioned 
above. Civil war in that country limited its 2011 production, 
which fell to 40,000 barrels per day in the third quarter of last 
year but is now expected to rise above one million barrels per 
day in 2012. Indeed, Bloomberg reported that Libyan produc-
tion had reached 1.3 million barrels per day in January 2012.
The increased volumes from Libya and Saudi Arabia will 
almost certainly satisfy global petroleum demand through 
2012 when added to the projected output of all other 
producers. Indeed, it would be very difficult to argue that total 
elimination of Iran’s net exports of 1.5 million barrels per day 
20. Kate Dourian, “Saudi Arabia Is Able to Meet Increased Demand for Oil: 
Naimi,” Platts on the Net, January 15, 2012.
21. John Defterios, “Saudi Arabia Is Ready to Turn Valves,” CNN Business360 
Global Exchange, January 16, 2012.
would affect markets as long as other producers continued at 
the expected level.22
The decline in European demand for crude oil, combined 
with increased Libyan production, addresses any deficit in 
European crude requirements caused by sanctions on Iran. The 
situation in Asia, though, could be different. Referring to table 
3 again, one observes that Asian buyers jointly acquire one 
million barrels per day from Iran, with China being the largest 
purchaser. Furthermore, Asian imports of Iranian crude have 
been rising. For example, China imported 555,000 barrels per 
day from Iran between January and December 2011, up from 
an estimated 388,000 barrels per day in 2010. This rise was no 
doubt tied to Iran’s favorable pricing.
The US sanctions, which take effect June 30, will require 
China to cut imports substantially to avoid confrontation with 
the United States, establish alternative barter-type arrange-
ments such as India’s, or find another crude source. South 
Korea and China face the same need. Saudi Arabia’s offer of 
increased production provides a way for these countries to buy 
less from Iran.
Exercise of Market Power by Other Producers
In the past, some oil exporters have used market disruptions 
to push oil prices higher. On occasion, for example, exports 
from Nigeria have unexpectedly declined just when the oil 
was most needed. Generally, the producing countries attribute 
such reductions to “accidents.” However, these events have a 
peculiar way of occurring at the most opportune times.
The last example of such exercise of market power came 
in 2008 when Nigerian output just happened to decrease as 
Atlantic Basin refiners desperately searched for sweet crude. 
The loss of Nigerian production was a primary contributor 
to the crude price rise from $70 to $125 per barrel between 
August 2007 and June 2008. At the time, the production 
decline was attributed to civil unrest in Nigeria. We will likely 
never know, though, whether it occurred from this discord 
alone or if other factors were involved.
The imposition of new EU and US sanctions on Iran will 
provide further opportunity for an oil-exporting country to 
exercise market power. Venezuela or Nigeria, for example, 
might cut production in an effort to push prices higher. 
However, changes in the refining industry reduce the prob-
ability of success for such actions. These changes include the 
closure of more than one million barrels per day of refining 
22. “Libya Oil Output Climbs to 1.3 mln bpd – NOC Statement,” 
Bloomberg, January 26, 2012.NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
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capacity in the Atlantic Basin and the imminent opening of 
the large Saudi/Shell facility in Port Arthur, Texas.
The refinery closures, summarized in table 4, have 
removed many of the oldest refineries that, due to tight-
ening environmental regulations, could buy only the lightest, 
sweetest crude oils. Their closing has led to a sharp decline in 
the premium offered for the best-quality Nigerian crudes rela-
tive to Brent and a decline in the premium offered for Brent 
compared with Dubai crude. These shutdowns greatly reduce 
the scope of market power once enjoyed by Nigeria. In effect, 
crude oil has become more homogenous.
The completion of Motiva’s enormous refinery rebuild in 
Port Arthur, a 50-50 joint venture between Saudi Aramco and 
Royal Dutch Shell, will further reduce producer market power. 
This facility will be able to process almost any crude into a 
high percentage of the light products in greatest demand, 
especially diesel.
Crude Quality Issues
Sanctions imposed on Iran could remove as much as two 
million barrels per day of Middle Eastern crude. Much of the 
oil lost to buyers in China, South Korea, and Japan—if it is 
lost—will be Iranian light crude. This crude has a gravity of 
33 degrees and sulfur content of 1.83 percent (see table 2). 
The replacement crude offered to these buyers by Saudi Arabia 
may be Arab Heavy, which has a gravity of 27.6 degrees and 
sulfur content of 2.94 percent (again, see table 2).
The heavier crude could pose problems for some refiners 
because it will yield less gasoil and the product will contain 
more sulfur. Refiners with sufficient desulfurization capacity 
will be able to cope. Some others, however, may face problems.
In the past, this issue of crude quality would have been 
serious. However, the recent shutdown of refining capacity 
noted above will make additional light sweet crude available. 
Those refiners with outmoded facilities should be able to blend 
this crude into the heavier Saudi oil and resolve their difficul-
ties. Again, the increased homogeneity of crude resulting from 
refinery closures will make adjustment much easier.
Response of the United States and Its Trading Partners
The US government’s response to actions its trading part-
ners—particularly China, South Korea, and Japan—take in 
reaction to the Iran sanctions will also influence price move-
ments. Chinese officials have made their objections known to 
the US government. They are not likely to flaunt their displea-
sure, though, for fear of giving the United States a chance to 
close financial links and thus impose a large, indirect tax on 
their imports. Instead, China will likely reduce imports from 
Iran and ask the United States for an “exemption” as defined 
under the law. South Korea and Japan will probably follow 
suit.
Thus, one can expect lower exports of Iranian crude to 
these countries but almost certainly not a total cessation of 
oil flows. The continued exports will moderate any upward 
pressure on prices.
Actions Taken by Refiners Obtaining Iranian Barter Oil
The impact of sanctions on prices will also depend on the ability 
of refiners purchasing oil from Iran under barter arrange-
ments to move the resulting products onto the world market. 
One can envision large Indian refiners absorbing significant 
volumes of Iranian crude purchased at a large discount. These 
refiners could then offer their products to global markets at a 
steep markdown, effectively depressing all prices.
Asian product buyers would see the greatest benefits of 
this initially. In time, though, the product discounting could 
have spillover effects on crude markets, first in Asia and then 
the Atlantic Basin. It is hard to know whether this type of 
discounting will occur. It is also hard to know how much 
product derived from discounted Iranian crude might hit the 
market.
Clearly the company to watch here is Reliance, the giant 
Indian refiner. Reliance could in theory purchase Iranian 
crude and export products. This would represent a reversal 
of recent actions, though, and could expose the firm to sanc-
tions. In fact, Reliance terminated a prior relationship where it 
Table 4     Refinery closures announced since  




Sunoco Marcus Hook 170
Sunoco Philadelphia 330
Conoco Trainer 185
Petroplus Petit-Couronne (France) 162
Petroplus Antwerp (Belgium) 108
Petroplus Cressier (Switzerland) 68
Hess Virgin Islands 350
Total 1,373
Source: Various industry sources.NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
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purchased up to 100,000 barrels per day of Iranian crude and 
sold gasoline back to Iran.23
Given the strong support for the Iran sanctions in most 
countries, I doubt that any refiner will engage openly in such 
action. However, some products refined from cheap oil may 
leak into the market and put direct or indirect downward pres-
sure on crude prices.
Importance of Global Economic Developments
Finally, the impact of the Iran sanctions will reflect devel-
opments in the global economy. The effect of any market 
disruption—whether by natural disaster, war, revolution, or 
economic policy—depends on economic circumstances at 
the time. The imposition of sanctions in 2006 or early 2007, 
a time of rapid global economic growth, would have caused 
very large oil price increases. Economic conditions today, 
though, are very different. The world economy is recovering 
23. Christine Forster, “India’s HPCL to Double Iranian Imports amid Iran 
Sanctions: Report,” Platts on the Net, January 10, 2012.
slowly from the Great Recession. New obstacles to the come-
back seem to appear every day, the latest being the inability of 
European governments to cope with their financial woes. The 
IMF recently acknowledged this reality, cutting its projection 
for global growth in 2012 from 4 to 3.3 percent and from 4.5 
to 3.9 percent for 2013. Europe’s problems are the primary 
justification for the revision. IMF economists now foresee a 
contraction in Europe of -0.5 percent in 2012 as opposed to 
growth of 1.3 percent projected only a few months ago.24
Even emerging-market and developing economies are 
affected by the slowdown. The IMF cut its 2012 growth 
projection for China to 8.2 percent from 9 percent and for 
Brazil from 3.6 to 3 percent. Table 5 presents a more detailed 
list of IMF forecasts.
One should expect further downward revisions given 
recent economic developments and the proclivity of fore-
casts to underestimate rates of decline and expansion. Global 
24. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, January 
24, 2012.
Table 5     IMF forecasts of 2012–13 global growth and 2012–13 growth in selected  
  countries made in September 2011 and January 2012 (percent change  


















World 4 3.3 –0.7 4.5 3.9 –0.6
Advanced economies 1.9 1.2 –0.7 2.4 1.9 –0.5
United States 1.8 1.8 0 2.5 2.2 –0.3
Europe 1.3 –0.5 –1.8 1.5 0.8 –0.7
   Germany 1.3 0.3 –1.0 1.5 1.5 0
   France 1.4 0.2 –1.2 1.9 1 –0.9
   Italy 0.3 –2.2 –2.5 0.3 –0.8 –1.1
   Spain 1.1 –1.7 –2.8 1.8 –0.3 –2.1
Japan 2.3 1.7 –0.6 2 1.6 –0.4
United Kingdom 1.8 0.8 –1.0 2.4 2 –0.4
Canada 1.9 1.7 –0.2 2.5 2 –0.5
Emerging-market and 
developing economies
6.1 5.4 –0.7 6.5 5.9 –0.6
Russia 4.1 3.3 –0.8 4 3.5 –0.5
China 9 8.2 –0.8 9.5 8.8 –0.7
India 7.5 7 –0.5 8.1 7.3 –0.8
Brazil 3.6 3 –0.6 4.2 4 –0.2
Mexico 3.6 3.5 –0.1 3.7 3.5 –0.2
Source: International Monetary Fund.NUMBER PB12-6  FEBRUARY 2012
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growth in 2012 will probably fall between 2 and 2.5 percent, 
well short of the current 3.3 percent forecast.
Slower growth will affect global oil consumption and 
demand for OPEC exports. In July 2011, IEA economists 
projected 2012 world oil consumption at 91 million barrels 
per day. This forecast has already been revised to 90 million 
barrels a day. Further changes are likely. On present trend, 
global oil use will probably decline in 2012 from the 89 
million barrels per day level achieved in 2011 to 88 million 
barrels per day.25
Given the global oil market structure, the lower consump-
tion forecasts will lead directly to cuts in the projected “call 
on OPEC,” which is the amount of oil OPEC would have to 
supply to meet the global consumption share not covered by 
output from other countries. In July 2011, the IEA projected 
the “call” at 30.7 million barrels per day. The most recent 
forecast cuts this to 30 million barrels per day. The reduction 
reflects a decline in projected consumption offset to an extent 
by a decline in projected non-OPEC production.
One should expect the “call” to be reduced further. In 
fact, the world’s requirement from OPEC could fall by at least 
the amount of Iranian exports, if not more.
Conclusion: No Price Impact from Sanctions
I conclude, then, that sanctions imposed by the European 
Union and the United States on Iran should have no impact 
on oil prices. This occurs because Iran is a relatively small 
exporter of crude, probably selling no more than two million 
barrels a day. These sales can be offset by increased production 
from other countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.
The geographical balance of Iran’s exports could cause 
some difficulties, however, especially since the European 
Union has prohibited imports from Iran entirely after June 30. 
The effect of this ban, which will eliminate almost 500,000 
barrels per day of supply to Europe, is offset by the closure 
of more than 300,000 barrels per day of EU refining capacity 
and the resumption of Libyan production. Europe should not 
be affected by the imposition of sanctions.
25. IEA, Oil Market Report, July 2011 and January 2012.
The situation in Asia could be different. China, Japan, 
and South Korea collectively import one million barrels per 
day of Iranian crude. Refiners there will no doubt be able to 
purchase replacement crude. However, those crudes may not 
be perfectly suited for their facilities. The mismatch could lead 
to price increases. On the other hand, the global economic 
malaise will probably make it possible to address any mismatch 
easily. In particular, the economic slowdown in Europe will 
reduce global oil consumption, facilitating adjustment.
The world, in short, can live without Iranian crude in 
2012 and probably 2013.
III. USE OF SURPLUS SPR STOCKS TO 
MODERATE PRICE INCREASES
US sanctions on foreign central banks doing business with 
Iran’s central bank are among the most draconian in recent 
years. The sanctions constitute a very big “stick.” However, the 
United States also has an enormous “carrot” to offer countries 
that work aggressively to lower imports from Iran: excess SPR 
crude. By my calculation, the United States had 276,394,000 
surplus barrels in the SPR as of October 31, 2011. The United 
States could sell some of this oil—perhaps 500,000 barrels per 
day for up to 18 months if the United States acted alone—to 
countries importing oil from Iran that work to reduce those 
volumes by purchasing crude from other sources.
The success of this strategy would reduce Iran’s oil export 
revenues from roughly $60 billion to $70 billion in 2011 to 
less than $20 billion in 2012. No doubt Iran would still sell 
oil at large discounts to countries such as India, but its income 
would be drastically lower.
The United States can offer this help because changing 
circumstances have left the nation with excessive strategic 
reserves. Under the Agreement on an International Energy 
Program (IEP Agreement), the United States and other signa-
tories pledged to build strategic stocks equal to 90 days of net 
imports. Declining consumption and increased production 
have reduced the United States’ IEP Agreement obligation. 
The US requirement peaked in May 2008 at 785 million 
barrels, a figure calculated by multiplying US monthly net 
imports by 90. Figure 3 shows my estimate of US monthly net 
imports for 2000 to 2011. For descriptive purposes, the data 
have been smoothed using a twelve-month moving average.
I note here that the imports shown in figure 3 exclude 
volumes from Mexico and Canada. There are two reasons for 
this adjustment. First, Canada and Mexico are IEP Agreement 
signatories. Second, in Canada’s case, its oil has no other place 
to go. Regarding Mexico, most of the country’s oil is unique 
and can be processed only in a few refineries. The primary 
… sanctions imposed by the European 
Union and the United States on Iran 
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facility for this is jointly owned by Mexico and Shell and 
located in Houston. That refinery processes the crude and 
returns a large portion of the products to Mexico.
In the future, this situation may change. Canadian 
government officials have reacted to President Obama’s rejec-
tion of the Keystone Pipeline by pursuing a western export 
option. This would take oil from Alberta west to British 
Columbia for shipment to China. The idea faces numerous 
legal hurdles, however, not the least of which is opposition 
from one hundred sovereign First Nation bands that enjoy 
much greater autonomy in Canada than Native Americans do 
in the United States.26 Moreover, hearings scheduled to last 
more than a year on the alternative project, dubbed “Northern 
Gateway,” began only in January 2012. This suggests that the 
flow of Canadian oil to the United States will increase steadily 
until 2015 or perhaps even 2017.
As can be seen from figure 3, US net imports, excluding 
Canada and Mexico, have declined almost 50 percent from a 
peak of 8.5 million barrels per day in May 2005 to 4.6 million 
barrels per day in October 2011. Many experts expect imports 
to decrease further as production from shale formations in 
Texas and South Dakota rises and consumption falls. (While 
26. “First Nations” is the term used by the citizens of Canada to describe the 
aboriginal groups that settled North America long before explorers from the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Spain first set foot on the North American 
continent. These native organizations enjoy protection under the Canadian 
Constitution as independent countries. They have the power to block the 
construction of pipelines across their lands. Today, they could effectively block 
the construction of a new pipeline by virtue of their ownership of lands in 
western Alberta and eastern British Columbia.
premature, a Wall Street Journal article has celebrated the 
United States’ emergence as a net fuel exporter.27)
The decline in US net imports frees up significant amounts 
of SPR stocks. According to my calculations, the United States 
had 50 million surplus barrels in January 2009, 200 million 
barrels in January 2010, and 225 million barrels in January 
2011. This number may be up to 300 million barrels now. 
Figure 4 traces the growth in strategic barrels.
The surplus SPR barrels should be used “strategically” 
to tighten sanctions on Iran. Specifically, the United States 
could negotiate with countries importing oil from Iran to 
replace one-third of those imports with oil sourced from other 
countries. Those that achieve this goal would be allowed to 
purchase an equal volume from the SPR. If done correctly, 
this strategy would cut Iran’s net oil exports from 1.5 million 
barrels per day to 500,000 barrels per day. This would also 
reduce Iran’s income from oil exports to less than $20 billion 
per year.
The sales proposed here could also make it easier for EU 
members to sustain their sanctions should they encounter 
difficulty in procuring crude. (The analysis in the previous 
section suggests, though, that Europe should experience no 
problems.) European nations, as of this writing, hold stocks 
covering only 30 days of imports. By comparison, US stocks 
covered 173 days of net imports at the end of October 2011. 
Europe should recognize the enormous advantage enjoyed by 
the United States and seek additional US support for its sanc-
tions program. 
27. Liam Pleven and Russell Gould, “US Nears Milestone: Net Fuel Exporter,” 
Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2011.
Figure 3     US net crude oil and product imports  
  excluding Canada and Mexico, monthly 
 data,    2001–11
million barrels per day (twelve-month moving average)
Source: US Department of Energy.
Figure 4     US surplus strategic stocks, monthly, 
 2001–11
million barrels
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The primary beneficiaries of offers of US strategic stocks 
will be China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey. Of the 
five countries, India and Turkey will no doubt have little interest. 
Firms in Turkey have already established a means of transacting 
business with Iran without involving Turkey’s central bank. 
These companies will likely seize the opportunity to squeeze 
Iran for discounts as other customers reduce purchases. There is 
very little the United States can do to stop such transactions. As 
noted earlier, oil firms in India will probably take the same path.
The situation for China, Japan, and South Korea is 
different. These countries are large importers of Iranian crude. 
Their manufacturers also produce the types of industrial goods 
that Iran’s nuclear program craves. Their refiners may also prefer 
lighter crude oils to the heavy types that may be offered as 
substitutes. It is essential that such firms not be allowed to estab-
lish barter arrangements that circumvent US sanctions. Sales of 
limited volumes of the crude required by refiners in these three 
countries could encourage complete cooperation by each.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States and Europe have introduced new, draco-
nian sanctions designed to prevent Iran from earning money 
from its crude oil exports. The sanctions will affect most 
oil-importing countries. They need not, however, pose prob-
lems for oil importers because OPEC has substantial surplus 
productive capacity. Furthermore, global oil use will likely 
remain at current levels or decline due to Europe’s economic 
problems. Thus the sanctions should not affect world oil 
prices.
The United States can help moderate any market difficul-
ties by selling oil from its strategic reserve, which now holds 
far more oil than required by treaty obligations. This strategic 
use of the SPR will increase the effectiveness of sanctions on 
Iran and ease the adjustment difficulties that confront US 
allies. The sales might also reduce any price pressure caused by 
removal of light Iranian crude from the market.
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